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NOTES AND COMMENTS
an unemancipated minor child, living as a member of the family, may
not maintain an action against its father for a negligent injury. There,
the court felt that the interests of society in the preservation of the
family as an economic and educational institution, and the interests of
the other family members in these same benefits forbade such an intra-
family lawsuit.20 The reasons underlying this policy are lacking in the
instant case. Indeed, a situation more violently dissimilar is difficult
to picture! Here the family is already disrupted.30  Here the action is
not against a parent but against one, not only a stranger to the family
relationship, but an intruder whose very act was the causal force in
destroying the home.
Precedents in North Carolina decisions recognize principles which
would have sustained allowing the cause of action in the instance case.3 '
A minor child living in the family home has been allowed to sue its
father's employer for an injury inflicted by the father's negligence. The
policy protecting the father did not extend to insulate the employer from
such an action.32  A minor child has been allowed to sue its parent
directly for support,3 3 although the child could not maintain such an
action at common law34 and no statute creates such a cause of action
in the child. In the light of these decisions the court's contention in the
instant case that it is powerless to provide a remedy is not persuasive.
RICHARD E. WAPDLOW.
Eminent Domain-Principles and Procedure-Power to Condemn
Dwelling-houses and Surrounding Premises for Highway Purposes
Eminent domain' is the power of the sovereign to take and use, alien-
ate, or destroy for the benefit of the public any species of property what-
soever lying within its territorial jurisdiction.2 It is, in effect, a funda-
"- Accord, Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677 (D. C. Cir. 1948) ; Mesite v.
Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929) ; Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss.
703, 9 So. 885 (1891) ; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905) ; Wick
v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927). Contra: Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538
(1932).
" The policy preventing a minor child from suing its parent has been held in-
applicable when the family unit was already disrupted. Green v. Green, 210 N. C.
147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936) ; Pickelsimer v. Critcher, 210 N. C. 779, 188 S. E. 313
(1936).
"1 For a discussion of the legal bases of such a cause of action and analagous
North Carolina decisions see Note, 28 N. C. L. Rav. 113 (1949).
-Wright v. Wright, 229 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 2d 540 (1948).
'a Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936) ; Pickelsimer v. Critcher,
210 N. C. 779, 188 S. E. 313 (1936).
14 Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308 (1891); Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W.
481, 151 Eng. Rep. 502 (1840) ; Shelton v. Springet, 11 C. B. 452, 138 Eng. Rep.
549 (1851).
'Grotius, an eminent publicist of the seventeenth century, originated the phrase.
See Wissler v. Yadkin River Power Co., 158 N. C. 465, 74 S. E. 460 (1912).
"Griffith v. Southern Ry., 191 N. C. 84, 131 S. E. 413 (1926); Clifton v.
Duplin Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 211, 111 S. E. 176 (1922); Jeffress v.
Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 919 (1911).
1950]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
mental condition attached to the ownership of property. Every title
is in this respect defeasible. 3 The power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty.
4
The fundamental limitation upon the right of eminent domain is that
property can be condemned only for a public purpose.5 No such provi-
sion is to be found in the North Carolina Constitution, but the principle
is treated as so fundamental that statutes in violation thereof are held
unconstitutional and void.( To meet this requirement, the use intended
must be ". . . by or for the government, the general public, or some por-
tion thereof a such, and not ... by or for particular individuals or for
the benefit of particular estates.' '7 Many jurisdictions hold it sufficient
if the intended use directly promotes the public welfare,8 but North
Carolina adopts a stricter test, holding that the general public must have
the right to use the property.0 Originally, property could be taken only
for essential purposes, but the rule has been relaxed, so that now prop-
erty can be taken for such non-essential purposes as parks, playgrounds,
public buildings,' 0 scenic highways, :1 cartways,' 2 etc.' 8  The question of
whether a proposed condemnation is for a public purpose is open to
Legal writers, in theorizing, often treat the power as arising from an implied
condition in the original grant from the sovereign to the individual. The sovereign
is said to have reserved the right to retake the property, should the interests of
the public so require. Raleigh & G. R .R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837) ; MmLs,
EMINENT DOmAIN §1 (1879).
' Although the Constitution of North Carolina contains no reference to eminent
domain, it was held in 1837 that the power of the state to condemn is "indispen-
sable, and incontestible." Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837);
Jeffress v. Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 919 (1911) ; State v. Jones, 139
N. C. 613, 52 S. E. 240 (1905).
Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N. C. 750, 40 S. E. 2d 600 (1946); Reed v. State
Highway Comm'n, 209 N. C. 648, 184 S. E. 513 (1936); Yarborough v. North
Carolina Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928) ; State v. Tyre Glen,
52 N. C. 321 (1859).
'Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283, 51 S. E. 932 (1905).
'Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N. C. 750, 40 S. E. 2d 600 (1946), quoting from
Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700 (1922).
8 Note, 15 N. C. L. Rav. 361 (1937).
' Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283, 51 S. E. 932 (1905) (condemnation
for a private railroad unconstitutional, even though the proposed use would have
developed natural resources, attracted wealth and population, etc.) ; Cook v:
Vickers, 141 N. C. 101, 53 S. E. 740 (1906) (sustaining condemnation for cartway
purposes, under N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-68 et seq. (1943), inasmuch as cartways
are open to the use of the public, even though laid out on application of, paid
for by, and primarily intended for the use of, private individuals). The require-
ment is that the general public have the right to use, not that it actually use.
And the terms upon which the public may use are subject to legislative regulation.
" Yarborough v. North Carolina Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563
(1928).
" Reed v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 N. C. 648, 184 S. E. 513 (1936).
" Parsons v. Wright, 223 N. C. 520, 27 S. E. 2d 534 (1943) ; Waldroup v.
Ferguson, 213 N. C. 198, 195 S. E. 615 (1938); Cook v. Vickers, 141 N. C. 101,
53 S. E. 740 (1906).
: N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943), and annotations, list a multiplicity of public
and quasi-public corporations delegated the power of eminent domain.
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judicial review ;14 but once it has been determined that the purpose is
public, the wisdom, expediency, and proper extent of condemnation are
matters primarily within the political discretion of the legislature and
the grantee of the power.15
Although no provision in the North Carolina Constitution requires
that just compensation be given for property taken under the power of
eminent domain, 1 3 it was held in 1859 that any legislative act which
attempts to take private property without just compensation is "uncon-
stitutional and void." 17 The principle has never since been questioned. 18
It may be noted that laws passed in the proper exercise of governmental
police powers which merely restrict the use of property, such as zoning
ordinances, -do not, properly speaking, take property by means of emi-
nent domain, and therefore do not require compensation. 19 But gov-
ernmental immunity extends no further, and compensation must be
given for any direct encroachment upon property rights, even though
the acts are done by express legislative authority, and in the proper
exercise of governmental functions.20
" State Highway Comm'n v. Young, 200 N. C. 603, 158 S. E. 91 (1931) ; Yar-
borough v. North Carolina Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928).
A legislative declaration that the condemnation is for a public purpose has per-
suasive, but not conclusive, weight. Reed v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 N. C.
648, 184 S. E. 513 (1936).
" Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N. C. 750, 40 S. E. 2d 600 (1946) ; Reed v. State
Highway Commn, 209 N. C. 648, 184 S. E. 513 (1936) ; State Highway Comm'n
v. Young, 200 N. C. 603, 158 S. E. 91 (1931); Yarborough v. North Carolina
Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928). But the court has indicated
that if there is bad faith, or manifest abuse of discretion, it will take cognizance of
these matters. See Selma v. Nobles, 183 N. C. 322, 325, 111 S. E. 543, 544 (1922) ;
Yadkin River Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N. C. 269, 274, 76 S. E. 267, 269 (1912).
" U. S. CoNsr. AMEND. XIV, §1, ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," ratified in 1868, was in
1896 construed to prohibit states from condemning land without giving just com-
pensation. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1896). The Fifth
Amendment, "... . nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation," ratified in 1791, binds only the Federal Government. Staton v.
Norfolk & C. R. R., 111 N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181 (1892); Raleigh & G. R. R. v.
Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837).
'7 State v. Tyre Glen, 52 N. C. 321 (1859). Early decisions sought to derive
the necessity for compensation from N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §17: "No person ought
to be . . .deprived of . . .property but by the law of the land." State v. Tyre
Glen, 52 N. C. 321 (1859); Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837).
But later decisions proudly recognize that the principle is based solely on judicial
fiat. Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N. C. 490, 120 S. E. 5 (1923);
State v. Lyle, 100 N. C. 497, 6 S. E. 379 (1888) ; Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N. C.
550 (1874).
' McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N. C. 540, 58 S. E. 2d 107 (1950) ; Lewis v. State
Highway Comm'n, 228 N. C. 618, 46 S. E. 2d 705 (1948) ; Staton v. Norfolk &
C. R. R., 111 N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181 (1892); Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550
(1874).
" McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N. C. 540, 58 S. E. 2d 107 (1950) ; In re Parker,
214 N. C. 51, 197 S. E. 706 (1938). Cf. State v. Tyre Glen, 52 N. C. 321 (1859).
But see N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-19 (1943), concerning scenic easements. (No
cases.)
" Clinard v. Kernersville, 215 N. C. 745, 3 S. E. 2d 267 (1939) (pollution of
stream by discharge from municipal sewage disposal plant) ; Rhodes v. Durham,
19501
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The measure of damages is the difference between the fair market
value of the entire tract immediately before the taking, and the fair mar-
ket value of the remainder of the tract immediately after the taking.21
The legislature may provide that damages are to be reduced by special
and general benefits, 22 or by special benefits alone, or that no benefits
shall be offset.23 At different times in our history, all three rules have
obtained, and all have been sustained by our court as "just compensa-
tion."2 4 Usually, only special benefits are offset.
25
The North Carolina Constitution declares that no person ought to
be deprived of property "but by the law of the land."20  With respect
to condemnation, the effect of the provision is to require that the owner
be given reasonable notice, and a fair opportunity to be heard, when
compensation is fixed. 27 It is not necessary that he be heard as to the
necessity for, or proper extent of, condemnation, that question residing
within the legislative discretion.28 It may be noted that the owner has
165 N. C. 679, 81 S. E. 938 (1914) (pollution of air by noxious odors from mu-
nicipal sewage- disposal plant); Hines v. Rocky Mount, 162 N. C. 409, 78 S. E.
510 (1913) (pollution of air by "foul stench" from municipal garbage and refuse
dump).
2 Proctor v. State Highway Comm'n, 230 N. C. 687, 55 S. E. 2d 479 (1949);
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Sloan, 227 N. C. 151 41 S. E. 2d 361 (1947);
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Carringer, 220 N. C. 57, 16 S. E. 2d 453 (1941).
In assessing compensation, the condemner is considered as having taken an interest
in the remainder of the tract, to the extent of the depreciation in its market value.
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Rogers, 207 N. C. 751, 175 S. E. 692 (1935) ;
Western Carolina Power Co. v. Hayes, 193 N. C. 104, 136 S. E. 353 (1927); cf.
Clinard v. Kernersville, 215 N. C. 745, 3 S. E. 2d 267 (1939).
" Special benefits are increases in property value "peculiar to the owner's land
and not in common with other landowners in the vicinity." Carolina Power &
Light Co. v. Reeves, 198 N. C. 404, 151 S. E. 871 (1930) ; Ayden v. Lancaster,
197 N. C. 556, 150 S. E. 40 (1929); Campbell v. Road Comm'rs, 173 N. C. 500,
92 S. E. 323 (1917). Any increase in property value shared by others in the
vicinity is a general, not a special, benefit. Ward v. Waynesville, 199 N. C. 273,
154 S. E. 322 (1930).
22 Miller v. Asheville, 112 N. C. 759, 16 S. E. 762 (1893); Elks v. Comm'rs,
179 N. C. 241, 102 S. E. 414 (1920) ; Lanier v. Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E.
850 (1917) ; Southport, W. & D. M R. v. Platt Land, 133 N. C. 266, 45 S. E. 589
(1903).
2' Elks v. Comm'rs, 179 N. C. 241, 102 S. E. 414 (1920) ; Southport, W. & D.
R. R. v. Platt Land, 133 N. C. 266, 45 S. E. 589 (1903) ; Miller v. Asheville, 112
N. C. 759, 16 S. E. 762 (1893).
2 Under N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-18 (1943) only special benefits may be offset by
those corporations authorized to condemn by N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943).
But the State Highway and Public Works Commission, under N. C. GE'. STAT.
§136-19 (1943), may offset both general and special benefits. See Elks v. Comm'rs,
179 N. C. 241, 245, 102 S. E. 414, 416 (1920), for an interesting rationale of the
distinction.
26 N. C. CONsT. Art. I, §17. This language traces its lineage to section 29 of
the Magna Carta.
ITState Highway Comm'n v. Young, 200 N. C. 603, 158 S. E. 91 (1931);
Yarborough v. North Carolina Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928);
State v. Jones, 139 N. C. 613, 52 S. E. 240 (1905).
28 State Highway Comm'n, v. Young, 200 N. C. 603, 158 S. E. 91 (1931);
Jennings v. State Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 68, 110 S. E. 583 (1922) ; Jeffress v.
Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 919 (1911) ; State v. Jones, 139 N. C. 613, 52
S. E. 240 (1905).
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no constitutional right to a jury trial in condemnation proceedings, al-
though N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-20 (1943) grants that privilege on ap-
peal to the Superior Court.29
Extensive delegation of the power of eminent domain has frequently
given rise to complex problems of statutory construction. In a recent
case3o the North Carolina Supreme Court questioned whether N. C.
GEN. STAT. §40-10 (1943)31 which exempts dwellings, gardens, etc.,
from condemnation by the corporations listed in N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2
(1943), also exempts such property from condemnation for highway
purposes by the State Highway and Public Works Commission (herein-
after referred to as the SH&PWC).32
"In the absence of constitutional or statutory restriction, the power
of the State to appropriate private property to public use exen'ds to
every species of property within its territorial jurisdiction."3 3 There
are no constitutional restrictions in this state, and if any property is
exempt from condemnation, it is only because some statute so pro-
vides.3 4 But it is a familiar principle that inasmuch as statutes dele-
" N. C. CoxsT. Art. I, §19. A condemnation proceeding, in which the amount
of damages is almost invariably the sole issue, "is not a controversy within the
meaning of the Bill of Rights, nor such a trial by jury as that instrument declares
shall be 'sacred and inviolable." Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451
(1837) ; State v. Floyd, 204 N. C. 291, 168 S. E. 222 (1933) ; State v. Jones, 139
N. C. 613, 52 S. E. 240 (1905).
" Proctor v. State Highway Comm'r, 230 N. C. 687, 694, 55 S. E. 2d 479, 484(1949).
1 4No such corporation shall be allowed to have condemned to its use, without
the consent of the owner, his dwelling-house, yard, kitchen, garden, or burial
ground, unless condemnation of such property is expressly authorized in its charter
or by some provision of this code."
"' The State Highway Commission was created in 1915. Until 1921 it was a
purely advisory body, with primary control of all highways still vested in the
counties, towns, and other political subdivisions of the state. In 1921, to meet the
requirements of federal aid appropriations, the key act for the present system of
state highways was passed. This act created a statewide system of about 5,500
miles of highways. In 1927 the State Highway Commission was empowered to
take over additional roads, not to exceed 20% of what it had already taken over.
Soon after, Governor Gardner became convinced that the best course was to dis-
continue entirely state grants of aid to counties for roads, and instead to centralize
control of all public highways in one agency, the State Highway Commission. In
1931 this was done, but the State Highway Commission was authorized to decline
to take over certain highways, in its discretion. In 1933 the State Highway Com-
mission was combined with the Public Works Commission and became the State
Highway and Public Works Commission. N. C. P. L. 1915, c. 113; N. C. P. L.
1921, c. 2; N. C. P. L. 1927, c. 200; N. C. P. L. 1931, c. 145; N. C. P. L. 1933, c.
172; Pate, Highway Administration it the South (1935)
" Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N. C. 490, 500, 120 S. E. 46, 51
(1923) ; Selma v. Nobles, 183 N. C. 322, 111 S. E. 543 (1922) ; Clifton v. Duplin
Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 211, 111 S. E. 176 (1922).
" Where an act gives "broadly and without restriction the right to condemn
private property for highway purposes, the right so given will include dwelling-
houses, tree and yards . . .unless such power is excluded under general or other
State laws applicable." Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N. C. 490, 500,
120 S. E. 46, 51 (1923) ; Clifton v. Duplin Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 211, 111
S. E. 176 (1922) ; Raleigh, C. & S. R. R. v. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 166 N. C.
168, 180, 82 S. E. 5, 10 (1914).
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gating the power of eminent domain are "in derogation of the ordinary
rights of private ownership" they are to be construed strictly against
the delegatee. 35
N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-19 (1943) delegates to the SH&PWC the
power of condemnation for highway purposes 36 and provides that in
exercising that power, "the ways, means, methods, and procedure of
chapter 40, entitled 'Eminent Domain,' shall be used by it as near as the
same is suitable for the purposes of this section." Does this provision
indirectly restrict the power of the SH&PWC to condemn dwellings,
gardens, etc., for highway purposes? Article I of Chapter 40 enumerates
certain corporations and delegates to them the power of eminent domain,
with certain special provisions in that regard, including the provision
in question, that no such corporation shall condemn dwellings, gardens,
etc., unless expressly authorized. Article II prescribes in detail the
procedure to be followed in condemnation proceedings, and except for
the prefatory provision in N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-11 (1943), is not con-
cerned with the nature and extent of the power to condemn, but rather
with the manner in which that power is to be exercised. Originally,
the two Articles were codified in separate chapters,37 but recent codifi-
cations have placed them in juxtaposition.3 8 It is apparent that the two
Articles are distinct, one delegating the power of eminent domain to
certain corporations, and delineating the nature and extent of that
power; and the other prescribing the special proceeding to be followed
when that power is exercised.
As noted, N. C. GEN. STAT. 136-19, granting to the SH&PWC the
power, makes reference to Chapter 40 only for the "ways, means, meth-
ods, and procedures." It, therefore, seems certain that the legislative
intent was to provide that the SH&PWC should exercise its power of
eminent domain in the manner prescribed in Article II of Chapter 40,
but that an indirect limitation of the power itself was not contemplated.
Neither Article I of Chapter 40, generally, nor N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-10
(1943), specifically, is concerned with "ways, means, methods, and
procedure."
" Board of Education v. Forrest, 193 N. C. 519, 137 S. E. 431 (1927) ; Griffith
v. Southern Ry., 191 N. C. 84, 131 S. E. 413 (1926) ; Carolina & N. R. R. v. Pen-
nearden Lumber Co., 132 N. C. 644, 44 S. E. 348 (1903).
11 N. C. GEa. STAT. §136-19 (1943) actually contains two distinct statutes, one
passed in the initial act of 1921, dealing with the right to condemn for the state
highway system; and the other passed in 1935, dealing with the right to condemn
for the Blue Ridge Parkway. The two statutes are markedly dissimilar, and their
codification into one section has wrought much confusion.
"' The Code of 1883 placed what is now Article I in Chapter 38, Vol. I, en-
titled "Internal Improvements"; and placed what is now Article II in Chapter 49,
Vol. I, entitled "Railroad and Telegraph Companies." The corporations delegated
the power of eminent domain by Chapter 38 were to follow the procedure set out
in Chapter 49.




Even if the exemption of dwellings, gardens, etc., were considered
a way, means, method, or procedure, the same are to be applicable to
the SH&PWC only insofar as "suitable for the purposes of this sec-
tion." If the SH&PWC were forced to so locate its routes as to avoid
every dwelling-house, garden, yard, kitchen, and burial ground en-
countered, the development of a state highway system would be seri-
ously impeded. Such a result would hardly be compatible with the
purposes of N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-19 (1943).
N. C. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 806, added a new subsection to N. C. GEN.
STAT. §40-2 (1943) which, in effect, gives the SH&PWC the power to
condemn land for facilities, a power not theretofore conferred upon it.39
Inasmuch as the corporations listed in N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943)
are subject to the provisions of N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-10 (1943),40 it
would seem that in granting this additional power by amending N. C.
GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943), instead of by amending N. C. GEN. STAT.
§136-19 (1943), the legislature intended to subject the power of con-
demnation for facilities purposes to the "dwelling house" limitation im-
posed in N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-10 (1943). But inasmuch as N. C. GEN.
STAT. §136-19 (1943) grants the SH&PWC the power of eminent do-
main for highway purposes, and N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943) grants
only the additional power of eminent domain for facilities purposes, only
that latter power should be limited by the provisions of N. C. GEN STAT.
§40-10 (1943). It is hardly probable that the legislature intended, by
the 1947 amendment, to limit indirectly the broad powers of condemna-
tion for highway purposes elsewhere conferred upon the SH&PWC.
LLOYD S. ELKINS, JR.
Federal Income Taxation-Sale of Corporate Assets-
Capital Gains Tax
When a corporation wishes to sell its assets the problem of capital
gains taxable to the corporation arises. If there has been an apprecia-
tion in the value of the assets, as usually there has been, the selling
corporation will be subject to a heavy capital gains tax on this appre-
ciation, and, in addition, its stockholders will be subject to a capital gains
tax on the proceeds of the sale when they are distributed, if the distribu-
" "The right of eminent domain may, under the provisions of this chapter, be
exercised . . .by the bodies politic, corporation, or persons following...
"9. The state highway and public works commission, for the purpose of acquir-
ing such land or property as may be necessary for the erection of or addi-
tion to any building or buildings for the purpose of housing its offices, shops,
garages, for storage of supplies, -material or equipment, for housing, caring
or providing for prisoners, or for any other purpose necessary in its work,
including the administration of the state prison system"
40 Clifton v. Duplin Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 211, 111 S. E. 176 (1922)
Raleigh, C. & S. R. R. v. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 166 N. C. 168, 180, 82 S. E. 5, 10
(1914).
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